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ABSTRACT 
 
 The purpose of this study was to determine the feasibility of applying the 
Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA) that was developed by Boeing to general 
aviation maintenance shops, either in its current form or with limited modification.  The 
MEDA investigation process has been implemented successfully by several major 
airlines and it was assumed that general aviation could also benefit from this safety 
enhancing process.  Because of the nature of the MEDA process, this paper only 
addresses the feasibility of applying the MEDA process to large shops.  After consulting 
aviation professionals and performing extensive research, a questionnaire was created 
and sent to numerous general aviation (GA) maintenance managers to determine their 
opinion of the feasibility of the application of MEDA to GA. A total of 6 responses were 
received and analyzed, from which it was concluded that the MEDA system could 
enhance safety in general aviation with certain alterations to the system.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 In a study conducted by the Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI), it 
was found that the accident rate for general aviation aircraft was twenty times greater 
than that of commercial aircraft.  Also, maintenance-related errors were found to be 
associated with 15% of major aircraft accidents, second only to pilot error (Goldman, 
Fiedler, King 2002).  These numbers take on more significance when the number of flight 
hours flown in general aviation operations is compared with those flown in scheduled air 
carrier operations.  In 2001, there were 25,431,000 flight hours logged by general 
aviation operations (NTSB 2001) versus 17,157,858 hours flown by scheduled air 
carriers during that same year (NTSB 2005).  These statistics show that general aviation 
flies 67% more flight hours than scheduled air carriers and also has an overall accident 
rate that is many times higher.  One of the reasons for the disparity in these accident 
numbers may be that most scheduled air carrier maintenance shops have multiple 
measures that are used to prevent errors from going undetected.  This is especially true at 
the large facilities that maintain the aircraft used by commercial airlines.  In general 
aviation there are very few systems in place to eliminate errors.  The purpose of this 
study was to determine the feasibility of applying a maintenance error investigation 
system to general aviation for the enhancement of safety.  Specifically, the application to 
general aviation of the Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA) system that was 
developed by Boeing to investigate errors and identify their contributing factors in order 
to reduce errors. 
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2. BACKGROUND  
2.1 – General Aviation Maintenance 
2.1.1 – General Aviation versus Scheduled Air Carrier Operations 
 Aviation is typically divided into three different segments: military operations, 
scheduled air carrier operations, and general aviation operations.  The latter two are 
considered civil aviation.  Of these, many people are surprised to learn that general 
aviation accounts for the majority of civil aviation operations.  Roughly 59% of all civil 
operations flight hours are considered “general aviation” (NTSB 2001) and is defined as 
“any civil aircraft operation that is not covered under Federal Aviation Regulations 
(FARs) Parts 121, 129, and 135 commonly referred to as commercial air carrier 
operations” (NTSB 2001) Under this definition, general aviation encompasses a wide 
variety of operations and aircraft ranging from single-engine piston aircraft flown for 
personal use to large multi-engine turbine aircraft used for business flights.  This could 
include everything from a Cessna 150 to a Boeing 737 Business Jet.  In general aviation, 
the maintenance organizations vary from an aircraft mechanic/owner/operator 
maintaining their own airplane to large maintenance shops that employ hundreds of 
mechanics and avionics specialists. 
 Because of the wide variety of aircraft operated under the general aviation 
definition, the organizations that maintain these aircraft are also very diverse.  Air Carrier 
maintenance is performed under FARs 121, 129, and 135 and has an extremely stringent 
set of maintenance requirements.  However, general aviation is regulated by FAR 91 and 
maintenance requirements are not as strict.  Most aircraft being operated in accordance 
with FAR 121 are maintained at a facility where there are numerous layers of quality 
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assurance and error prevention systems.  In general aviation this is not normally the case.  
At many general aviation shops there are no systems in place to prevent or investigate 
errors.   
 
2.1.2 – General Aviation Maintenance Safety Record 
 
 In many general aviation maintenance shops, mechanics succumb to pressure 
from customers to get aircraft back to flight status quickly and with minimal cost.  It is 
not uncommon for a mechanic to allow a discrepancy to pass an inspection without 
correction if they do not judge it to be an immediate hazard to flight safety.  This might 
even mean ignoring a mandatory Airworthiness Directive (AD) because of the time and 
cost required to perform the corrective action.  This is evidenced by the statistic that 
23.9% of maintenance related errors were associated with an Aircraft Maintenance 
Technician violation (Shappell and Wiegmann 2004).  This type of error is considered an 
intentional violation by the FAA.   
General aviation has a much higher accident rate in comparison to scheduled air 
carrier operations.  Most of these accidents are caused by pilot errors, but there are also a 
substantial number of maintenance related accidents (Goldman, Fiedler, King 2002).  
Approximately 7.1% of all general aviation (GA) accidents that occurred between 1988 
and 1997 had at least one maintenance related error as a primary cause or factor, 
amounting to 1,474 accidents during that ten year period (Goldman, Fiedler, King 2002).  
In Shappell and Wiegmann’s study General Aviation Maintenance Accidents: An 
Analysis Using HFACS and Focus Groups maintenance errors were broken down into 
four categories: skill-based errors (SBEs), violations committed by Aviation Maintenance 
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Technicians (AMTs) (VMAINT), violations by owner/operators (VOO), and decision 
errors (DE).  The percentage of which each of these categories were attributed to 
maintenance-related accidents is shown in Table 1 and a graphical representation is 
shown in Figure 1.  It is noteworthy that of these errors the violations committed by 
owner/operators were by far the most likely to cause a fatal accident, in fact, “nearly 1/3 
of the accidents attributed in part to a maintenance violation committed by an 
owner/operator were associated with fatalities” (Shappell and Wiegmann 2004). 
 
2.2 – Human Factors 
 Wiener and Nagel’s book, “Human Factors in Aviation”, defines human factors 
(or ergonomics) as:  
“. . . the technology concerned to optimize the relationships between 
people and their activities by the systematic application of the human 
sciences, integrated within the framework of system engineering.” 
In simple terms, the field of human factors is the study of how humans interact with their 
environments.  The goal of which is to create systems where the human element is 
integrated most efficiently and the system design considers human error, and attempts to 
minimize its occurrence.  In the context of this thesis, human factors are considered with 
respect to the activities of the AMT in a general aviation environment.  Whether dealing 
with confusing instruction manuals or inspecting aircraft under poor lighting conditions, 
human factors plays a role in every aspect of the aviation maintenance atmosphere.  The 
following is a description of the tools that were used in the analysis of the data collected 
in this study. 
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Table 1: Maintenance-Related Accidents Causes 
 
Figure 1.  Maintenance-related accidents and their causes.  Weigmann and Shappell 2004 
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 2.2.1 – The SHEL Model 
 Developed by Elwyn Edwards, the SHEL model has been widely used to analyze 
the interactions between systems elements.  For this study, problems were known to 
occur at the interfaces of system elements and this system provided a tool to study these 
occurrences.  The four parts of the SHEL model are: Software, Hardware, Environment, 
and Liveware.   
1. Software is the rules, procedures, and regulations that govern a particular activity, 
in this case GA maintenance.  
2. Hardware is the physical property that is involved in this activity, such as the 
aircraft undergoing maintenance or the tools used to perform a task.  
3. Environment is the setting under which all of these elements are brought together.  
4. Liveware is the human factor that interacts with the other elements of the SHEL 
model. 
Figure 2 shows a visual representation of the SHEL model and the way that the system 
elements interact.  This shows that all of the elements are linked together and occur in the 
same environment. 
 
2.2.2 – Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 
 Prior to the year 2000, there was no system in place to analyze aviation accidents 
from a human factors standpoint.  Recognizing the need for such a system, Scott Shappell 
and Douglas Wiegmann from the FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute developed the Human 
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS).  This system is based on James  
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 Figure 2.  SHEL Model 
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Reason’s “Swiss Cheese” model that describes the way that errors are not just a result of 
a single failure, but instead a series of latent failures that eventually allows an accident to 
occur (Reason 1990).The latent failures can be very difficult to identify, because they 
may have been present, yet undetected, for a long period of time before the accident 
occurs (Shappell and Wiegmann 2000).  One of the main purposes of the MEDA system 
is to identify these latent failures.  HFACS is a tool that can be used to analyze accidents 
to determine the cause of an error and are used later in this paper to look at some case 
studies that might be addressed by the implementation of the MEDA system.   
 
2.2.3 – Human Error 
 In his book Human Error, James Reason states that the definition of human error 
is: 
“Error is intimately bound up with the notion of intention.  The term 
‘error’ can only be meaningfully applied to planned actions that fail to 
achieve their desired consequences without the intervention of some 
chance or unforeseeable agency.  An error is NOT intentional.  You make 
an error when: what you do differs from what you intended; or your plan 
was inappropriate.” (Reason 1990) 
It is important to notice the emphasis that errors are not intentional.  Aircraft mechanics 
do not intend to commit an error, especially one that could lead to a tragic accident.  This 
paper and the systems that it addresses are not intent on trying to place blame on a person 
for committing an error.  Instead, the purpose of these systems is to identify the 
contributing factors that lead to errors and correct them to prevent future accidents.   
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 The HFACS system identifies three types of errors: skill-based errors, decision 
errors, and perceptual errors (Shappell 2000).   
1. Skill-based errors include errors due to attention failures, memory failures, and 
technique errors. 
2. Decision errors are grouped into three areas: procedural errors, poor choices, and 
problem solving errors. 
3. Perceptual errors occur when “one’s perception of the world differs from reality.” 
(Shappell 2000) 
An in-depth description of these errors can be found in Shappell and Wiegmann’s report 
titled The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System – HFACS.  When used in 
this paper these terms for errors will refer to the HFACS definition presented in this 
report.   
 
2.2.4 – Contributing Factors 
 Often called “performance shaping factors” in the human factors technical world, 
contributing factors are used to describe conditions that contribute to an error.  The 
MEDA User’s Guide defines “a contributing factor to an error is anything that negatively 
affects how a maintenance technician or inspector does his/her job.” These contributing 
factors cover a very broad range.  They can be as simple as having poor lighting during 
an inspection, or be as complicated as a decision that was made by upper management 
years before an incident that eventually led to an unsafe situation.  The model shown in 
Figure 3 helps to clarify the concept of contributing factors. 
A critical aspect of the idea of contributing factors is that errors are almost never  
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Figure 3.  Contributing Factors to Maintenance Error.  Source: MEDA User’s Guide.  2003 
  
caused by just a single contributing factor. Instead, it is a series of contributing factors 
that leads to the error.  This once again refers to James Reason’s “Swiss Cheese” model 
where “holes”, which represent absent defenses against error, in multiple protection 
layers line up to allow a mishap to occur (Reason 1990).  However, perhaps the most 
important thing to note is that “80%-90% of contributing factors to error are under 
management control, while the remaining 10%-20% are under the control of the 
maintenance technician or inspector” (MEDA User’s Guide 2003).  This concept forms 
the basis of how the MEDA system works and why it will or will not work in general 
aviation. 
 
2.2.5 – Human Factors in Aviation Maintenance 
 There has been a large volume of research performed directly relating the 
application of human factors to aviation.  The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
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even has an entire division for human factors, along with a section for human factors in 
aviation maintenance.  However, the large portion of human factors research in aviation 
maintenance that has been performed focuses on the scheduled air carrier maintenance 
setting.  As discussed earlier, airline maintenance is very different than general aviation.  
Despite this, there have been a few significant works that directly address general 
aviation maintenance human factors.  A paper written by the Civil Aerospace Medical 
Institute (CAMI), Drs. Shappell and Wiegmann, titled General Aviation Maintenance 
Accidents: An Analysis Using HFACS and Focus Groups noted that general aviation 
lagged behind commercial air carriers when it came to the amount of research performed 
on human factors (Shappell and Wiegmann 2004).  
 Despite the lack of GA maintenance human factors research, most of the research 
that has been performed at commercial air carriers can be applied to GA simply because 
the basic functions and responsibilities of a GA AMT and a commercial air carrier AMT 
are very similar.  Because of this, the statistic that installation errors accounted for 29.3% 
of skill-based errors may also apply in premise to general aviation.  For this reason, a 
system that works to investigate the contributing factors in a commercial air carrier 
setting could also feasibly be applied to general aviation.   
 
2.3 – Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA) 
 The aforementioned references, and others, have shown that there are contributing 
factors that lead to human errors.  There was an obvious need to investigate errors and 
identify contributing factors with the goal of eliminating those factors.  This may prevent 
future errors and the accidents they cause.  In the mid-1990s, a group of Boeing 
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representatives and other interested parties met over the course of 18 months to develop a 
system that would investigate these errors (Rankin 2000).  The outcome of these 
meetings led to the Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA) process to investigate 
errors at airlines. 
 The MEDA process differs from error prevention programs because it is designed 
as an investigation tool to uncover contributing factors.  There is also a difference in the 
philosophy behind MEDA: 
“The Maintenance Error Decision Aid process was developed based on the 
philosophy that maintenance technicians do not make errors on purpose, 
that errors result from a series of related contributing factors, and that 
these factors are largely under management control and, therefore, can be 
changed.” (Rankin 2000) 
This philosophy that contributing factors can be corrected is the core idea behind MEDA 
system development.  This differs from other maintenance error programs called Aviation 
Safety Action Programs (ASAPs) mainly because the FAA is not directly involved.  Most 
ASAPs use an Error Review Committee (ERC) to gather information that can be used to 
determine the contributing factors of an error and the FAA is usually represented on these 
committees.  Many AMTs are reluctant to voluntarily come forward and admit errors 
when they know that the FAA will be part of an ERC. 
 Another error related system is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) 
that was developed as a means for aircrew and maintenance technicians to report errors.  
The person filing the report is given limited immunity as long as no criminal acts were 
involved and no accident occurred in return for voluntarily reporting errors.  The 
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downfall of the ASRS system is that it is generally considered an aircrew reporting 
system with very few AMTs making reports and there is no attempt to identify the 
contributing factors that led to the error.  The MEDA process does both of these. 
 
2.3.1 – The MEDA Process 
 The MEDA process is based on the MEDA Error Model shown in Figure 4.  This 
model shows the order in which an error causes an event and the probabilistic 
relationship between each of the steps.  This means that after a contributing factor occurs 
there is a probability that it may or may not cause an error and an error has a probability 
of leading to an event.  However, some probabilities are higher than others and can 
almost be assured to lead to the next step.  For example, if an engine is drained of oil and 
the oil is mistakenly not refilled, then it is almost certain to lead to an engine failure. 
There are four major events and a number of intermediate steps in the MEDA 
process.  First, an investigation is conducted after an incident occurs to determine if 
maintenance error was the cause, and if so, the person responsible for the error.  Second, 
an interview of the responsible individual determines the contributing factors to the error 
and corrective action that needs to be taken to eliminate these factors.  This information is  
 
 
Figure 4.  MEDA Error Model.  Source: MEDA User’s Guide. 2003 
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entered into the MEDA Results Form and subsequently a database.  Third, the corrective 
action is put in place and monitored for effectiveness.  Lastly, the person that committed 
the error and all other employees are provided feedback about the corrective action.  This 
shows that the process is being used to make improvements and it is not being used to 
punish maintenance technicians (MEDA User’s Guide 2003).  Figure 5 shows the 
complete MEDA process in contrast to a typical airline investigation process.  
The most important part of the MEDA process is the interview with the 
responsible technician.  This is perhaps the most difficult part of the investigation.  At the 
time of the interview the maintenance technician responsible is “probably the world’s 
expert on the contributing factors to that specific error” and “on what changes need to be  
 
Figure 5.  MEDA Process flow chart.  Source: Rankin 2000. 
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made to the contributing factors in order to keep them from contributing to future, similar 
errors.” (MEDA User’s Guide 2003).  It is the job of the interviewer to use the interview 
to determine both the contributing factors and the corrective actions that need to be taken 
from the technician’s perspective.   
 The MEDA Results Form is the most critical piece of paperwork that is part of the 
MEDA process.  This form is used to identify the error, contributing factors, and 
corrective actions.  To make the MEDA system truly effective, the Results Form should 
be archived in a database that is shared company wide and ideally industry wide.  This 
will help other technicians and companies implement measures to eliminate the 
contributing factors that can cause this specific error.  Over time this database should 
help to significantly reduce the number of errors that occur.   
 
2.3.2 – MEDA System Implementation 
 The MEDA system was field tested in 1994 and 1995 at eight airlines and one 
repair station.  The system was implemented at these companies for a trial period and 
questionnaires were sent to the new MEDA investigators both before and after 
implementation of the system.  Questionnaires were also given to the maintenance 
technician(s) involved in the investigations and management personnel.  Completed 
Results Forms from the field test were also analyzed for correct completion and the data 
from the forms was compiled and summarized.  Finally, meetings were held with the test 
organizations to get their feedback on their experience with MEDA (Rankin 2000).  For 
detailed results of these methods of analyzing implementation, consult the paper 
Development and evaluation of the Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA) process as 
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published in the “International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics” in the year 2000.  From 
this test evaluation, there were many positive reports of the success of the MEDA 
process.  In general, investigators, managers, and technicians all agreed that the MEDA 
process was helpful and would reduce future errors.  It was also noted that the system did 
not create much more work for those involved.  Overall, the consensus was that MEDA 
should be permanently implemented at all airlines and it was a useful tool to everyone 
involved in the process (Rankin 2000). 
 The acceptance of the MEDA process at the airlines was overwhelming.  In fact, 
by 1997 over 60 additional maintenance programs had begun implementing MEDA 
(Rankin 2000).  Therefore, acceptance was not considered to be a large problem with 
MEDA once the system was implemented.  However, the implementation of MEDA has 
proven to be very difficult in some cases.  Initial resistance by management, fear of 
punishment by technicians, and resistance to more paperwork have all been difficulties in 
implementing MEDA.  Companies with a history of punishing technicians for errors find 
technicians extremely hesitant to volunteer information about errors.  This greatly 
reduces the effectiveness of the MEDA process. 
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3. EXPERIMENT AND APPROACH 
3.1 – Application of the MEDA process to General Aviation 
 The success of the Maintenance Error Decision Aid in a scheduled air carrier 
atmosphere suggests that this system could be beneficial if applied to general aviation.  
Since GA has a much higher maintenance related accident rate as compared to the 
airlines, it is apparent that something must be done to reduce this rate.  While the MEDA 
system was designed to be used with airline maintenance organizations, the fundamental 
principles behind MEDA also apply to GA.  Human error is the same whether it happens 
in the airline setting, GA setting, or any other industry.  The principle that AMTs do not 
purposely make mistakes is as true for general aviation as it is for anyone else.  
 Given that the term “general aviation” encompasses such a wide variety of 
organizations, it is most likely that a system such as MEDA may not apply to the entirety 
of this segment of aviation.  The small maintenance shops that employ a handful of 
technicians would probably not see much benefit from a maintenance error investigation 
system, because the managers of these small shops are typically aware of errors that are 
made and the reasons behind them.  If an error is made at a small shop, it is most likely 
corrected by direct action immediately following the error.  An error investigations 
system, with all of its paperwork, would probably be seen as more of burden than a help.  
For this reason, it is expected that only large maintenance shops employing at least 25 
technicians would be receptive to implementing MEDA.  Therefore, this paper only 
addresses the feasibility of applying the MEDA process to these large shops.  
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3.2 – Research Methods 
Numerous scholarly papers, text books, and conversations with industry experts 
were used to gather the preliminary data for this paper.  Research performed by Dr. Scott 
Shappell, formerly of the FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute; Dr. Douglas A Wiegmann, 
professor of psychology and aviation at the University of Illinois in Urbana-Champaign; 
Dr. William Rankin, Technical Fellow at Boeing; and many others provided much of the 
data used to analyze the feasibility of the MEDA system’s application to general aviation. 
A questionnaire was created and sent to Directors of Maintenance/General 
Managers at large general aviation maintenance shops, which is very similar to the way 
that Boeing determined the effectiveness of MEDA in the airline setting.  These 
questionnaires were designed to utilize these industry professionals’ opinions to 
determine acceptability of the MEDA system in GA.  The questionnaire consisted of 32 
opinion questions with multiple choice answers ranging from “strongly disagree” to 
“strongly agree”.  These questions were followed by a list of contributing factors that are 
ranked by the respondent from 1 to 11 in order of what the respondent believes is the 
most likely contributing factors to cause maintenance errors.  Finally, two short answer 
questions were asked, along with a comments section, to determine the respondent’s 
opinion of various aspects of maintenance error investigation systems.  Refer to 
Appendix A for an example of the questionnaire.  
The 32 opinion questions were divided into four categories: current shop 
conditions, punishment/corrective action, error probability/control, and error 
investigation system acceptability.  These categories were further broken down to reflect 
whether a positive answer resulted in a positive outcome or negative outcome.  All of the 
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question responses were averaged to give an overall opinion of the four questionnaires.  
The ranking list of contributing factors was also averaged to determine a consensus of the 
order of most influential contributing factors.  From comments made by the questionnaire 
respondents, the ranking of contributing factors was the most difficult part of the 
questionnaire.  This is because there are often contributing factors to an error that are not 
easily identifiable.  Despite this, all of the respondents were in general agreement as to 
the order of which factors contribute to errors the most.  
 The questionnaires were sent to 23 medium to large GA maintenance shops, 
however only 6 questionnaires were returned.  The response rate of 26% was lower than 
expected and was due to a host of factors, the most common was simply time constraints 
that did not allow the respondents the time to fill out a questionnaire.  In spite of the low 
number of responses, the trends allowed the formation of an educated opinion on the 
feasibility of applying the MEDA system to general aviation.  
 
3.2.1 – Short Answer Question One: Benefits and Difficulties 
 The first short answer question was: “What positive benefits and difficulties could 
you foresee that implementing an error investigation system would create?” This question 
was asked to give the respondents a chance to state their opinion about the foreseeable 
pros and cons of an error investigation system.  From this, it was hoped that the 
respondent’s first overall opinion of the MEDA system could be determined. 
 
3.2.2 – Short Answer Question Two: Limited Immunity  
 The second short answer question was: “Do you believe that granting technicians 
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limited immunity from punitive action for errors they report would increase the 
likelihood of them admitting errors? (Immunity from non-malicious, non-criminal acts)” 
This questions addresses fear of punishment as a major factor that may prevent 
technicians from admitting errors.  The respondents probably know their mechanics 
better than anyone, and therefore would know if granting limited immunity would spark 
more error reports.  
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4. RESULTS 
4.1 – Contributing Factors 
The average of the result for each of the contributing factors list responses were 
ranked, in order of likeliness to contribute to an error, as follows: 
1. Communication between people, shifts, and organizations 
2. Job/task (e.g., monotonous, too complex, different from similar tasks, etc.) 
3. Qualifications/skills of technician, lead, or supervisor regarding task, 
process, or system issues 
4. Factors specific to an individual (e.g., size, fatigue, task interruption, time 
constraints, etc.) 
5. Supervision (e.g., poor planning/organization, inadequate prioritization, 
delegation of work, etc.) 
6. Information (e.g., manuals, work cards, and procedures) available to the 
technician (e.g., not understandable, not available, not used, etc.) 
7. Equipment/tools/parts (e.g., unsafe, unavailable, mis-calibrated, wrong 
tool, etc.) 
8. Airplane design/configuration (e.g., complex, accessibility problems, 
configuration variability, etc.) 
9. Organizational factors (e.g., support from other organizations, company 
policies, processes and procedures, morale, etc.) 
10. Facility factors (e.g., lighting, ventilation, hazardous/toxic substances, 
etc.) 
11. Environmental factors (e.g., heat, humidity, snow, vibration, etc.) 
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 Figure 6.  Contributing factors to maintenance error in order of likely to contribute to error.  
 
Figure 6 shows the rank of each contributing factor which from left to right is 
likely to contribute to error.  Communication was found to be the factor most likely to 
cause maintenance error, while environmental factors were the least likely.   
4.2 – Opinion Questions 
 The following charts were generated by assigning categories and points for each 
of the responses to the opinion questions.  The answers available were: “strongly 
disagree”, “disagree”, “no opinion”, “agree”, and “strongly agree”.  Table 2 shows the 
point system that was used.  For each opinion question, the total numbers of points were 
summed and each point category was calculated for its percentage of the total number of 
points.  These charts show the percent of each category over a 100% scale.  The raw data 
for each of the charts can be found in Appendix B. 
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Table 2.  Opinion Question Point System 
Opinion Question Point System 
Answer Category 
  Disagree No Opinion Agree 
Strongly Disagree 2     
Disagree 1     
No Opinion   1   
Agree     1 
Strongly Agree     2 
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4.2.1 – Current Shop Conditions 
 
Current Shop Conditions
My shop needs some type of system to report errors
Technicians are not afraid to admit making errors
Technicians receive detailed feedback from
supervisors about task performance
Technicians are kept informed about potential problem
areas w here errors are likely to occur
More aw areness training about errors made by
technicians w ould increase aviation safety
Technicians are satisf ied w ith their w orking
environment
There is a need at this company to reduce maintenance
error
"Lessons learned" from maintenance errors are shared
so that the errors are less likely to occur again
Technicians are alw ays trained w ell enough to perform
their tasks accurately and w ith confidence
"Shoot from the hip" or "best guess" decisions are used
around here to solve problems
Maintenance Manuals, Service Bulletins, company
policies, etc. are available as needed
Maintenance Manuals, Service Bulletins, company
policies, etc. are presented in understandable formats
Disagree
No Opinion
Agree
Percentage of Total Responses
Each tick mark represents 10% of the total
 
Figure 7.  Current Shop Condition Questions Results. 
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 4.2.2 – Punishment/Corrective Action  
 
Punishment/Corrective Action
Punishment is often used to discipline technicians for
making errors
Disciplinary actions are fairly applied and justif ied
Punishment usually results in improved performance
When technicians make errors, the best solution is to
provide more training 
This company investigates maintenance incidents
thoroughly 
There w ill be less punitive action taken against me or
others if  the MEDA process is implemented
Disagree
No Opinion
Agree
Percentage of Total Responses
Each tick mark represents 10% of the total
 
Figure 8.  Punishment and Corrective Action Questions Results. 
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 4.2.3 – Error Probability/Control 
 
Error Probability/Control
Even w hen tired, technicians perform effectively
during critical phases of w ork
Technicians are likely to make errors w hile performing
routine tasks
Most errors are caused by factors that the technician
has no control over
Maintenance error could happen to anyone, even the
best technician
Technicians are likely to make errors w hile performing
complex tasks
Experienced technicians do not make errors
Disagree
No Opinion
Agree
Percentage of Total Responses
Each tick mark represents 10% of the total
 
Figure 9.  Error Probability and Error Control Questions Results. 
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 4.2.4 – Error Investigation System Acceptability 
 
Error Investigation System Acceptability
My shop needs some type of system to report errors
There is a need at this company to reduce
maintenance error
I fully agree w ith the MEDA philosophy that most
maintenance errors are not intententional, but are
mainly a result of factors that contribute to the error
There w ould be a strong acceptance of an error
investigation process, such as MEDA, by my
company's maintenance technicians
There w ould be a strong acceptance of an error
investigation process, such as MEDA, by my
company's management
I believe that it is important for the companies that use
an error investigation system to share their results
w ith other companies
Maintenance error investigations w ill increase if  the
MEDA process is implemented
There w ill be less punitive action taken against me or
others if  the MEDA process is implemented
Maintenance error, overall, w ould decrease over time
as a result of using MEDA, or a similar system
I think that an error investigation system w ould be
useful for discussing existing barriers that cause
incidents
Using an error investigation system, such as MEDA,
w ill not create more w ork for me
Disagree
No Opinion
Agree
Percentage of Total Responses
Each tick mark represents 10% of the total
 
Figure 10.  Error Investigation System Acceptability Questions Results. 
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4.3 – Short Answer Questions 
4.3.1 – Short Answer Question One: Benefits and Difficulties 
 From the first short answer question, regarding benefits and difficulties, the 
respondents were split between the number of benefits and difficulties.  Most felt that it 
would be beneficial to implement an error investigation system, but that there would 
certainly be some challenges.  From the results, the benefits were seen to be: constant 
overview of errors, development of discrete steps and expectations which would in turn 
help eliminate errors, information about contributing factors would benefit the entire 
industry if shared and an increase in awareness that would result in a reduced risk of an 
incident.  The most common difficulty that was foreseen by the respondents was time 
constraints.  They felt that it would be difficult to find time to implement an error 
investigation system, but that it was not impossible.  One respondent said that it would be 
hard to get their company to accept the system.  It was also felt that some businesses 
would be reluctant to make their errors common knowledge whether they would be 
identified or not.  Proper execution of the error investigation system was also a concern 
of one of the managers. 
 
4.3.2 – Short Answer Question Two: Limited Immunity 
When asked if the managers believed that granting technicians’ limited immunity 
from punitive action for errors they reported would increase the likelihood of them 
admitting errors, so long as they were non-malicious or non criminal acts, they responded 
unanimously that it would help foster reporting.  This would be similar to the ASRS 
system where those that report incidents are granted limited immunity from FAA 
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prosecution.  In this case, it would be immunity from action by the company itself.  One 
of the respondents said that, “in reality there will always be some fall out to making an 
error, even if limited immunity was granted.” Another was quoted as saying, “a true 
aircraft technician that is dedicated to our industry would care enough to admit when he 
or she has made an error.” The others simply stated “yes” that it would help increase 
error reports.  
 
4.3.3 – Comments and Suggestions 
Comments and suggestions were made by a number of the respondents.  One said 
that simplicity was important, while another said that a global system instead of just a 
company system would be more beneficial to general aviation safety.  One of the 
comments in particular agreed with the philosophy behind MEDA by saying,  
“The key is to address root cause and not symptom.  This may appear to 
be an over-simplification, but too often we forget that most issues occur 
when two or more issues line up in a situation.  There is often a rush to 
take action and little in-depth review to prevent/eliminate background 
issues such as equipment, worker movement between projects, or tooling 
issues.” 
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5.  DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
5.1 – Contributing Factors 
See figure 6 for a graphical representation of the contributing factors as ranked by 
the respondents in order of most likely to occur.  The most influential contributing factor 
was considered to be communication between people, shifts, and organizations.  This 
agrees with a survey of senior US maintenance mechanics who stated that the most 
challenging part of their job was “human relations or dealing with people” (Reason and 
Hobbs 2003).  Oftentimes, technicians make assumptions that someone else has already 
completed work, because they were not told that it was uncompleted.  A case study 
reported by the MEDA evaluation group discussed how a technician left rags in a fuel 
tank for the next technician to use to finish the job.  However, the technician that 
followed believed the job to be completed and returned to the aircraft to service with the 
rags still in the fuel tanks.  These errors lead to a fuel system blockage in flight and 
subsequent aircraft diversion to the nearest airport (Rankin 2000).  From the results, the 
respondents believe that communication is a major problem in the aircraft maintenance 
industry. 
 Following closely behind communication, the respondents believed that job/task 
difficulties are the most influential contributing factors.  This category includes 
difficulties due to the task being repetitive, too complex, or very different from other 
tasks that are normally performed by the technician.  Many technicians will attempt to 
perform a task that is too complex for their experience without asking for assistance just 
to avoid embarrassment.  Sometimes the technician may be well qualified for the 
complex task, but makes an error because of extreme difficulty of the job.  Another error 
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in which the job/task is a causal factor is when a technician has been performing a task 
and suddenly has to change procedure to complete another task that is very similar.  For 
instance, if a technician has been inflating the tires of a certain model airplane and then 
has to inflate the tires of another model, this can lead to the technician accidentally 
over/under filling the tires.   
 Rounding out the top three contributing factors as ranked by the respondents are 
the qualification and skills of the technician, lead, or supervisor.  This means that the 
respondents feel that experience and skill factor into the ability of a person to prevent 
errors to a great degree.  This is a particularly strong factor when the task at hand is one 
that the technician has not performed in the past.  James Reason and Alan Hobbs describe 
this situation: “Most maintenance personnel have had the experience of carrying out a 
new task, while not being entirely sure whether they were doing it correctly.  Such trial-
and-error performance is by definition prone to being unreliable” (2003).  Unfortunately, 
this happens very often in aviation maintenance because AMTs perform such a wide 
variety of tasks.  
 The remaining contributing factors are basically self-explanatory.  Despite this, 
there are a few things that are important to note about these results.  One of these is that 
the contributing factor “factors specific to an individual” was reported to be only the 
fourth most likely factor to contribute to an error.  One of the definitions listed with this 
factor was time constraints and it has been shown from previous studies that time 
constraints are one of the leading contributing factors to maintenance errors.  In their 
study Aircraft Maintenance Safety Survey – Results, Hobbs and Williamson found that 
“time pressure was the most frequently mentioned factor leading to incidents.” They also 
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found that 32% of technicians surveyed reported not performing a functional check due 
to time constraints and an astonishing 76.5% reported having turned a blind eye to a 
minor defect to prevent delaying an aircraft (Hobbs and Williamson 1998).  It is probable 
that time pressure is more likely to cause an error than the respondents perceived.  
Another noteworthy result from the respondents was that organizational, facility, 
and environmental factors ranked as the three least likely factors to contribute to 
maintenance error.  These factors probably ranked low because they are normally 
secondary contributing factors, meaning that they are combined with other “primary” 
factors before they result in an error.  While this is normally the case, one of these factors 
will almost always be included in a list of contributing factors of an error that is analyzed 
to determine its causal factors.  Overall, the respondents agreed with prior studies that 
have been performed on the subject of contributing factors, apart from these few 
exceptions. Because of the low spread in all of the responses, the standard deviation from 
these results is very small and there is little concern about bias since this was a random 
sample. 
 
5.2 – Opinion Questions 
5.2.1 – Current Shop Conditions 
For a graphical representation of opinions on the current shop conditions, refer to 
figure 7.  The first opinion question asked the respondents if they felt that their shop was 
in need of a system to report errors.  The respondents unanimously agreed that their shop 
needed some type of system to report errors.  Also, 67% said that there was a need to 
reduce maintenance errors at their company.  However, most of those surveyed believed 
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that their organization did not use “shoot from the hip” or “best guess” decisions to solve 
problems that might arise, which means that they try to make effective decisions, but they 
believe errors will still occur.  These results show that it is probable that a maintenance 
error/investigation system would be beneficial to general aviation organizations that are 
trying to be as professional as possible. 
 Most of those polled felt that technicians were kept informed about potential 
problem areas, but they strongly agreed that more awareness training would help to 
improve aviation safety.  The respondents said that technicians did not receive enough 
training to perform all of their tasks accurately and with confidence.  The solution to this 
that sounds the easiest is that more training should be provided, however the consistent 
problem with increasing training is that it imposes serious time constraints, because it 
takes time away from a paying job.  If training levels go up, productivity will go down, at 
least in the short term.  In the long run, though, more training would mean fewer errors 
and less rework, so productivity would probably rise.  
 Two of the most strongly agreed upon questions were about written information 
availability and understandability.  The respondents were unanimous in their agreement 
that maintenance manuals, service bulletins, and company policies were available to the 
technicians as needed.  They also agreed that these documents were presented in 
understandable formats.  However, a study of European airlines “found that unclear task 
cards or vague procedures were among the main reasons for deviations from maintenance 
procedures” (Reason and Hobbs 2003).  Therefore, it is possible that, since management 
was the target of this questionnaire, it may appear to management that written 
information is understandable, but to the technician who actually has to read them, they 
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may appear confusing.  
 83% of the maintenance managers surveyed felt that the AMTs working for their 
company were satisfied with their working environment.  However, only 50% felt that 
technicians were not afraid to admit making errors.  It is notable that these two were 
linked together for the most part.  The stronger that the respondent felt the technicians 
were satisfied, the less afraid they were to admit making errors.  This shows the close tie 
between trust of management and willingness to admit mistakes.  This will be a key to 
the implementation effectiveness of an error investigation system.  
 
5.2.2 – Punishment/Corrective Action 
 For a graphical representation of opinions on the punishment and corrective 
actions questions refer to figure 8.  One of the greatest obstacles to successfully 
implementing an error investigation system will be getting technicians to admit errors if 
the organization has a history of punishing technicians.  According to answers to 
questions about punishment, 83% of the respondents said that their company did not 
normally use punishment to discipline technicians for making errors even though 67% of 
the managers believed that punishment did result in improved performance.  This is in 
contrast to the study that was performed by the MEDA evaluation group in which only 
9% believed that punishment improved performance (Rankin 2000).  When asked if they 
felt that implementing the MEDA system would result in more punitive action against 
them or others, the respondents were mixed in their opinions with 33% feeling it would 
result in more punitive action, 33% did not know, and 33% felt that it would not lead to 
punitive action.  
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Instead of using punishment, the majority of the respondents felt that training was 
the best solution to prevent errors from happening again.  However, as mentioned before, 
training requires time and resources.  It is far easier to simply punish a technician than it 
is to take the time and money to train them more effectively.  Although, the training 
could be as simple as having a senior technician show a younger one how to properly 
perform a task or demonstrate areas that are prone to error.  It would be difficult, though, 
to have a formal system to train technicians for every error that is made.  An informal 
approach would probably work better.   
 
5.2.3 – Error Probability and Error Control 
 For a graphical representation of opinions on the error probability and error 
control questions refer to figure 9.  The maintenance managers were asked multiple 
questions regarding error probability and error control.  All but one of the respondents 
believed that fatigue played a significant factor in the ability of technicians to perform 
effectively.  According to Reason and Hobbs, “Recent research has shown that moderate 
sleep deprivation of the kind experienced by shift workers can have consequences that 
are very similar to those produced by alcohol” (2003).  From this, a technician that has 
been awake for an extended period of time can show degradation in performance similar 
to a drunken person.  Most general aviation maintenance shops do not run multiple shifts 
and it is not unusual for technicians to be asked to work longer than a normal eight hour 
shift.  This situation often leads to fatigued technicians working on complex tasks.  
Therefore, it is likely that fatigue would be a contributing factor to error that could be 
identified by an error investigation system.  
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  Interestingly, the respondents recognized that technicians not only committed 
errors during complex tasks, but also while performing routine tasks.  This means that 
they realize that errors can happen at any time, although they are probably more likely to 
occur during complex tasks.  Along the same lines, the maintenance managers believed 
that maintenance error could happen to anyone and even experienced technicians 
committed errors.  There were no questions asked to determine what factor experience 
played in the likeliness of errors, but since qualifications and skills ranked number three 
on the list of contributing factors discussed earlier, it definitely plays a major role.   
 Perhaps the most important question that was asked of the respondents was if they 
believed that most errors were caused by factors that the technicians had no control over.  
The overwhelming majority of respondents agreed that the technician was not in control 
of the contributing factors to maintenance error.  This is an extremely important 
viewpoint, because it shows that something out of the realm of the technicians control 
needs to be corrected to prevent future errors.  This is the exact philosophy of the MEDA 
system.  The very purpose of the system is to try and identify these contributing factors in 
order to correct them.  
 
5.2.4 – Error Investigation System Acceptability 
For a graphical representation of opinions on the error investigation system 
acceptability questions refer to figure 10.  The final category of opinion questions that 
were asked related to how the maintenance managers believed an error investigation 
system would be accepted in general aviation.  As mentioned before, the managers polled 
believed that their shop needed to reduce maintenance errors and a system to report 
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errors.  They also all agreed with the MEDA philosophy that errors were not committed 
intentionally, but instead were the result of a number of contributing factors.  During 
interviews, the managers agreed that technicians did not come to work with an intention 
of making an error and the technicians themselves would like to never make an error.   
The respondents were mixed in their opinions of whether the maintenance 
technicians would strongly accept an error investigation process.  However, they felt that 
management was likely to strongly accept a system such as MEDA.  Managers believed 
that the technicians might be afraid of a system that was investigating errors that they 
committed.  They felt that technicians would fear punishment to them or others as a result 
of any investigation.  Trust in management is critical.  Without trust it is unlikely that 
technicians would accept an error investigation system.  However, a strong acceptance by 
the company’s management would enhance implementation of an error investigation 
system.   
The overwhelming majority of maintenance managers believed that it was 
important for companies that use an error investigation system to share their results with 
other companies.  This would allow for other companies to learn from errors made 
somewhere else and hopefully prevent the same thing from happening at their 
organization.  The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) that was developed by 
NASA is similar in that it shares incident information through a published database.  
While the respondents did not necessarily believe that a public database would be the best 
solution, they did agree that general aviation companies needed a way to share their 
results from error investigations.   
One of the most positive results from the error investigation system acceptability 
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questions was that the respondents felt that maintenance error investigations would 
increase if the MEDA process was implemented and over time maintenance error would 
decrease as a result of using MEDA, or a similar system.  They also strongly agreed that 
an error investigation system would be useful in discussing existing barriers that cause 
incidents.  This shows that there is a strong favorable opinion of the benefit of using an 
error investigation system in general aviation. 
Most of the respondents felt very strongly that a system such as MEDA would 
result in more work for them, on top of their already great burden of work.  This is a very 
legitimate concern, because despite the fact that errors overall would decrease, there 
would be more paperwork associated with the errors that did occur.  This is one of the 
few reasons that a system such as MEDA might be difficult to implement in general 
aviation.  There are usually not as many levels of management and supervision at general 
aviation shops as there are at airline maintenance facilities, therefore those in 
management perform at the peak constantly.   
 
5.2.5 – Short Answer Questions 
 From the responses to the short answer questions, it would appear that, overall, 
the respondents believe that the implementation of an error investigation system, such as 
MEDA, in general aviation would be beneficial by reducing future errors and increasing 
safety.  None of the respondents expressed a negative opinion about the idea of 
implementing MEDA in general aviation.  This leads to the assumption that maintenance 
managers at larger general aviation shops will be receptive to the idea of an error 
investigation system at their organization.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 It is probable that the implementation of an error investigation system will be met 
with resistance because of fears of more work, punishment, and the effectiveness of the 
system.  However, from the questionnaire results, it was found that maintenance 
managers agreed that a system was needed to reduce the number of errors at their shop 
and they saw communication as a major problem.  They also agreed fully with the 
MEDA philosophy that technicians did not intentionally commit errors.  It was felt that 
strong acceptance by management and trust in management by technicians would be key 
factors in the implementation of an error investigation system.  However, time constraints 
would be a major problem in implementing MEDA because most general aviation 
managers are already stretched to their maximum.   
Overall, aviation is a very safety minded industry, which is shown by the general 
opinion, according to the respondents, that general aviation companies need a way to 
share their results from error investigations.  In addition, most felt that the system would 
be strongly accepted by management at their company, although the technicians may be 
reluctant.  It will not be surprising if there is some initial resistance to the system.  
However, the results from this study have shown that an error investigation system can be 
implemented in general aviation.   
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7. RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 – Modification of the MEDA Process to Suit General Aviation 
 To better suit general aviation, the MEDA system needs to be modified.  This 
would include altering the results form to reflect the general aviation environment (see 
Appendix C for an example MEDA results form).  References to airline procedures in the 
results form would need to be modified to reflect general aviation.  These include 
references to ATA #, airline name, fleet number, aircraft zone, and type of maintenance 
(line or base).  These items are not needed, because they do not represent elements of 
general aviation maintenance.   
 From the results of this study, limited immunity needs to be granted to the 
technicians that report errors.  This would increase the number of error reports and would 
likely increase the acceptance of the MEDA system by technicians.  As noted before, 
limited immunity would not protect the technicians against criminal acts and should 
therefore not result in a rise in violations.   
  
7.2 – Further Research 
 Further research is needed in several areas before the MEDA system could be 
applied to general aviation.  First, a detailed study of how to adapt the system to general 
aviation should be conducted.  This would include, among other things, an in-depth look 
at the differences between airline maintenance and general aviation to determine if items 
should be added or removed from the results form.  Second, an implementation plan for 
general aviation needs to be designed, including how to create a database that can be 
shared freely amongst the industry.  Finally, a number of pilot programs should be 
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conducted by implementing the MEDA system at a number of large general aviation 
maintenance shops and analyzing the results of the system over an extended period of 
time.  Once these studies have been conducted, implementation of the MEDA process 
could begin in general aviation. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
Current Shop Conditions 
Opinion Questions – Responses 
Question Strongly Disagree Disagree 
No 
Opinion Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
My shop needs some type of system to report 
errors 0 0 1 4 1 
Technicians are not afraid to admit making errors 0 1 2 2 1 
Technicians receive detailed feedback from 
supervisors about task performance 1 0 1 4 0 
Technicians are kept informed about potential 
problem areas where errors are likely to occur 0 1 0 5 0 
More awareness training about errors made by 
technicians would increase aviation safety 0 0 0 4 2 
Technicians are satisfied with their working 
environment 0 1 1 3 1 
There is a need at this company to reduce 
maintenance error 0 1 1 4 0 
"Lessons learned" from maintenance errors are 
shared so that the errors are less likely to occur 
again 
1 2 0 2 1 
Technicians are always trained well enough to 
perform their tasks accurately and with confidence 0 3 1 2 0 
"Shoot from the hip" or "best guess" decisions are 
used around here to solve problems 1 3 0 2 0 
Maintenance Manuals, Service Bulletins, 
company policies, etc. are available as needed 0 0 0 2 4 
Maintenance Manuals, Service Bulletins, 
company policies, etc. are presented in 
understandable formats 
0 0 0 4 2 
Current Shop Conditions - Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 49
Punishment/Corrective Action 
Opinion Questions - Responses 
Question Strongly Disagree Disagree 
No 
Opinion Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Punishment is often used to discipline technicians 
for making errors 1 3 1 1 0 
Disciplinary actions are fairly applied and justified 0 2 0 4 0 
Punishment usually results in improved 
performance 0 2 1 1 2 
When technicians make errors, the best solution is 
to provide more training  0 1 2 2 1 
This company investigates maintenance incidents 
thoroughly  1 2 0 2 1 
There will be less punitive action taken against me 
or others if the MEDA process is implemented 0 2 2 2 0 
Punishment/Corrective Action Responses 
 
 
 
Error Probability/Control 
Opinion Questions - Responses 
Question Strongly Disagree Disagree 
No 
Opinion Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Even when tired, technicians perform effectively 
during critical phases of work 1 4 0 1 0 
Technicians are likely to make errors while 
performing routine tasks 0 2 1 2 1 
Most errors are caused by factors that the 
technician has no control over 0 2 1 1 2 
Maintenance error could happen to anyone, even 
the best technician 0 0 0 4 2 
Technicians are likely to make errors while 
performing complex tasks 0 2 1 1 2 
Experienced technicians do not make errors 1 2 0 3 0 
Error Probability/Control Respnses 
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Error Investigation System Acceptability 
Opinion Questions - Responses 
Question Strongly Disagree Disagree 
No 
Opinion Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
My shop needs some type of system to report 
errors 0 0 1 4 1 
There is a need at this company to reduce 
maintenance error 0 1 1 4 0 
I fully agree with the MEDA philosophy that most 
maintenance errors are not intentional, but are 
mainly a result of factors that contribute to the 
error 
0 0 1 4 1 
There would be a strong acceptance of an error 
investigation process, such as MEDA, by my 
company's maintenance technicians 
0 2 2 2 0 
There would be a strong acceptance of an error 
investigation process, such as MEDA, by my 
company's management 
0 1 1 3 1 
I believe that it is important for the companies that 
use an error investigation system to share their 
results with other companies 
0 0 1 3 2 
Maintenance error investigations will increase if 
the MEDA process is implemented 0 1 1 4 0 
There will be less punitive action taken against me 
or others if the MEDA process is implemented 0 2 2 2 0 
Maintenance error, overall, would decrease over 
time as a result of using MEDA, or a similar 
system 
0 1 0 5 0 
I think that an error investigation system would be 
useful for discussing existing barriers that cause 
incidents 
0 0 1 5 0 
Using an error investigation system, such as 
MEDA, will not create more work for me 1 3 1 1 0 
Error Investigation System Acceptability Responses 
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